

Editorial Board
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1 The Cultural Contradictions of
Progressive Politics

The Role of Cultural Change and
the Global Economy in Local
Policymaking
Donald L. Rosdil

2 Securitization of Property
Squatting in Europe

Mary Manjikian

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Mary Manjikian

In Europe

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To Lucine

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Acknowledgments

I arrived in Russia as a single woman in the mid-1990s, eager to begin an assignment as a US Foreign Service junior officer. As part of the check-in process, I was assigned an apartment. That evening, I went to view the apartment in downtown Moscow and immediately noticed that it seemed like a dangerous place. The front door to the building was unlocked, and my companion assured me that the drunken men in the stairwells were harmless. It was very dark as it was set back in the woods and the street lights were out, perhaps permanently.

The next day, I contacted the embassy security office and expressed my concerns about living in this location as a single woman who would frequently be traveling on my own. "There's always Rossinka if you're scared," I was informed. I filled out the necessary paperwork and was then assigned a townhouse in Rossinka, along with a bus pass. The years I spent in Russia make up my first and only experience of living in a gated community, and an enclave for foreigners. I spent my Russian years walled off from the rest of Russian society, occupying a prefab townhouse in a prefab townhouse community that had been brought over from the United States and assembled, like a gigantic jigsaw puzzle. The community was set far away from downtown Moscow and Rossinka's occupants were bussed back and forth to the embassy compound daily. It was easier certainly, living in an exact replica of a townhouse that might have fit in in Alexandria, Virginia, or another Washington, DC, suburb. It felt safer—but it also felt sterile and artificial to be so divorced from the Russian inhabitants of the original village of Rossinka, which was located down the road from the foreigners' enclave.

This book is my attempt to wrestle with some of the questions that arose out of that experience. Usually when we think about the politics of security in international relations, we think of hard power and state-level politics. Yet increasingly, as foreigners and natives interact in a variety of settings throughout the world, these negotiations about security occur on a local level as well. Both those who inhabit a country and those who come to visit or to work bring certain assumptions about safety, about risk and about identity into this equation.

My thinking about housing and the politics of fear was further piqued when I spent a summer teaching in England. While I lectured, my teenaged

daughters spent their mornings watching British television. This led to my eventually viewing a British television show provocatively titled *Vacation Nightmares*. The show featured a segment on two British homeowners whose home was taken over by property squatters while they were away on holiday. I was immediately struck by the shrill overtones of the reporting, the attempt at constructing a threat and the ways in which the foreignness of the squatters themselves was alluded to but not addressed directly. Thus, I have dedicated this book to my daughter Lucine, who initially introduced me to the subject of property squatting, as well as other forms of sensationalist British television. I hope that one day she will dedicate a book to me when she begins her own scholarly career.

In writing this book, I also owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the members of Regent University's women's faculty forum for the lunches, the encouragement and the support. I am, as always, grateful to my husband, Ara, for his interest in my research, his support of my scholarship, and his graphic design abilities as he formatted the charts and figures in this book. Finally, I would like to thank our new dean, Dr. Eric Patterson, for the support he has shown me as I continue in my research career.

Finally, I wish to insert two quick methodological notes here. First, because property squatters are often anarchic in their politics and secretive by nature, the cites listed in this manuscript are sometimes a bit unconventional. The squatters' view has been largely derived from my perusal of anarchist web sites, where the respondents often do not list their full names and sometimes use aliases and pseudonyms. I also found few property squatters willing to talk to me about these issues, either on the record or off. For this reason, I acknowledge up front that the citations and the information itself are sometimes incomplete.

Next, I would like to take full responsibility for the section on the Netherlands. The translations are my own, as are any errors.

Introduction

Housing, Neighbors and the Politics of Fear

Squatting, the practice of living in abandoned or unoccupied spaces that a squatter does not legally own, is a great way to avoid paying rent, if you're willing to take the risk. While many squatters are routinely evicted, arrested, harassed, or even, in some parts of the world, beaten or killed, some manage to make comfortable long-term homes on someone else's property. . . . Squatting may be the solution to your housing needs.

From "How to Squat in Abandoned Property"

<http://www.wikihow.com>

At first glance, property squatting seems like a relatively straightforward public policy problem. Squatting is generally defined as "an illegal, collective or individual, occupation of a building in order to get a house and to claim housing rights without the permission of the owner."¹ Initially, squatting appears as a problem of real estate, and therefore a problem that looks similar regardless of whether it takes place in Nepal, China, South America or Europe. In the cycle of property squatting, there are several steps. First, the disenfranchised citizens of an area attempt to take possession and build upon land they do not own and the landowners attempt to defend what is theirs from unauthorized interlopers. Not infrequently, the police are called upon to intervene upon the side of the landowners. The property developer in particular may pressure city bureaucrats to engage in "slum clearing" or rezoning—so that squatters can be forced out. Occasionally a nongovernmental organization (in both the developing world and the developed world) will attempt to advocate for the squatters, speaking directly with police and with the state, and in some instances seeking publicity in the newspapers. Often, the conflict between the two groups takes on the appearance of a dance, with police acting on behalf of the state to restore order to the territory through clearing slums and shooing away squatters. But the squatters invariably return, largely because they have nowhere else to go. The steps of the dance are also quite ancient—with conflicts between squatters, poachers and landowners recorded in documents dating back to the Middle Ages.

However, despite the ubiquity and pervasiveness of this problem, it is one that is largely undertheorized by political scientists. If property squatting is studied at all, it is most often studied by political economists as a problem of market economics and the allocation of resources. Here squatting is described as rooted in poverty and the problems caused by quick and large-scale economic transitions such as a nation's rapid urbanization. In such a situation, economists suggest that large numbers of individuals come from the countryside to the city seeking economic opportunity. When they cannot afford housing, they may construct housing without a permit (eventually constructing squatter villages) or occupy empty houses somewhere in the cities that they go to. Squatting is thus viewed as a byproduct or an externality arising from a broken housing market. The economics literature (as well as the urban politics literature on housing policy) focuses primarily on understanding and posing suggestions for the repair and better working of institutional mechanisms for setting housing prices, responding to crises in the housing market and, in some instances, providing justice and equity for the dispossessed. Thus, it may have a normative component in considering the workings of social welfare policies and the provision of public housing.

More recently, however, sociologists have taken an interest in the issue of property squatting, not focusing here on the property or the mechanisms by which it is contested, but rather seeking to understand the property squatters themselves on both an individual and a community level. In the sociology literature, property squatting is viewed as a type of deviant behavior that might be engaged in by marginalized, powerless individuals. Those who have no ability to legitimately acquire or claim housing might thus acquire housing at the margins of society—with their housing thus becoming a symbol of their own marginalized status. Those who are marginalized in this way include the Roma population throughout Europe² as well as disenfranchised youth in both the developed and developing worlds.³

However, thus far, sociologists—like the economists—often tend to conflate relatively separate types of squatting: Subaltern squatting is a practice engaged in by those who are disempowered, marginalized within society and have nowhere else to go. (Here, we might consider work on the “Roma” or “Gypsy” squats⁴ that have grown up outside such cities as Lyon, Marseilles and Berlin.) However, there are others who have historically squatted in Western Europe not because they were poor but because they were ideologically motivated to make a statement about what they view as the rightness and justness of individual property ownership. These so-called anarchist squatters tend to be younger, better educated and potentially more likely to destabilize a city or neighborhood. Sociologists, however, have not clearly distinguished between the two groups and most literature focuses only on the socially marginalized.

In addition, the sociology literature improperly problematizes squatting and treats squatters only as objects of inquiry. The analyst thus poses the question “How do we solve the problem of property squatting?” rather than

seeking to understand or learn from the squatters themselves. Here legal, illegal and marginal housing residents are regarded as the subject of housing policy, rather than agents involved in creating housing or solving the housing crisis, and are often not the primary unit of analysis, which tends to be instead the social work office or the social worker.⁵ The squatter himself is often referred to as a “victim.”⁶

Historians have also considered squatters—often romanticizing the property squatter as a sort of Robin Hood whose taking of unauthorized land and housing might thus be seen as a sort of political and moral statement.⁷ (Interestingly, this is the only group of analysts who have imbued the squatter with a great deal of agency—both political and moral.)

Finally, scholars in the field of public policy and law have theorized about squatting, largely through considering the ways in which housing is both a public and a private good.⁸ In this case, the emphasis is on the operation of adverse possession laws. The unit of analysis is the state itself, and the starting point of the analysis is that squatting is a problem requiring state-led policy solutions, including legislation. Those policy scholars who have focused on property squatting have focused largely on the phenomenon as it is presented in the developing world. Case studies have examined squatters in India⁹ and in Latin America.¹⁰

Furthermore, both legal scholars and political economists use a positivist framework in which they assume that housing shortages can be measured, citizen responses can be predicted and theorized and neutral policy positions can be created. Legal issues considered in the squatting literature include theorizing about the rights of squatters in both a national and international human rights context. Issues include the question of whether police have violated individuals' human rights when they enter a squat without legal authorization for the purposes of carrying out search and seizure. Here, for example, they might ask whether a squat can be considered a “legal residence”—with the same rights to privacy attached to it as there would be if the squatter lived in a conventional home.¹¹ Here the issue becomes particularly complicated when those involved in the case are not legal residents or citizens of the nations where the violation occurred, an increasingly common occurrence in a globalized world.

However, thus far, no author has attempted to theorize about property squatting within the context of national security. Rather, analysts might mention in passing that the creation of squatter settlements is potentially destabilizing to a state—particularly a weak state—often theorizing about squatter settlements created as a result of border disputes and refugee flows. However, such an analysis thus treats squatting merely as a byproduct of some other larger and seemingly more important social problem—such as poverty or disaster—rather than as a security problem in its own right. In addition, squatting is mentioned as an important part of the growth of megacities—but the security aspects of having a largely unregistered and uncounted population that resides within a city's borders without legal status are often not addressed.

SQUATTING AS A SECURITY PROBLEM

Why then, we might ask, have security scholars not considered this problem, despite estimates that one in six of the world's residents, or as many as 1 billion people, today are property squatters?¹² Here the simplest explanation is that for many years, security studies scholars have conceptualized security as an activity within the realm of international relations, or something that occurred only at a macro level. As Weiss notes, historically, issues involving borders and defense of the state were the job of the national military forces, while issues involving domestic order or crime were the job of international organizations such as the police.¹³ Indeed, the state's own identity rests, according to some analysts, on its ability to define itself in relation to and to respond to threats in the international system. Thus, in explaining the evolution of a nation's historic identity as well as its foreign policy, one might ask questions such as "Who does the nation seek to defend itself from?" and "What factors explain the differences between nations?"¹⁴

In contrast, issues of neighborhoods, housing and the people who dwell in these neighborhoods are regarded as matters of local or domestic politics. Border policies thus have a "politics" since they are matters of state policy, while domestic issues such as crime prevention and the apprehension of criminals do not. And individuals within the state are regarded as having committed a crime against a community or an individual, but they are not commonly regarded as engaging in antistate actions. If one violates housing policy, one is therefore branded a common criminal, rather than a threat to state security.¹⁵

The international relations theorist R. B. J. Walker refers to an "inside/outside" distinction in explaining how the two spheres of politics differ, noting that they differ largely because they are practiced in such different environments—the domestic and the international.¹⁶ However, one can observe that politics is not only *conceptualized* differently in the two environments but often also *practiced* quite differently as well. In the (for the most part) orderly world inside the state, we may expect politics to be characterized by thoughtful, deliberative debates. There is usually no emergency, no crisis, no threat of imminent attack and often little genuine hostility between participants in a debate. (For example, participants at a city council meeting may differ about the importance of spending on education in the local community. However, despite differences of opinion, it is likely that neither side feels existentially threatened by the other.) Even when local politicians and pundits disagree, we can assume that in an ordered polity the communities and institutions will survive and that local politicians, like the mayor, will not overstep their bounds in designating enemies or marshaling forces to respond to a perceived threat.

In contrast, politics within the anarchic international system is more frequently characterized by high conflict and high stakes. Issues are more often viewed through a lens of security, in which one's enemies are viewed as an existential threat to the state itself.¹⁷ In this high-threat environment, the

rhetoric of securitization is more often deployed in order to bring about a situation in which international decisions are made quickly, with less public input and discussion since policy making is viewed as a response to a crisis or an emergency. As Williams suggests, the language of securitization creates an understanding that an issue cannot be tackled using our regular everyday political logic. Instead, he notes, the implication is that "If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or will not be free to handle it in our own way."¹⁸ Securitization thus transforms an issue from a mere nuisance to one that threatens "our very way of life."

And it is here that we arrive at the puzzle that led to this book. How is it that in the urban areas of many Western European nations, domestic policy issues having to do with housing, illegal immigrants and squatters have thus come to be viewed through the lens of securitization in the late 2000s? How is it that neighborhood relations are more often described in both the media and by politicians themselves as being in a state of emergency in which stringent measures must be taken in order to protect citizens and the neighborhood? What is different about neighborhood relations today, in comparison to neighborhood relations in the 1980s, that has caused citizens and policymakers to increasingly use the language and rhetoric of security to describe measures that must be taken? How is it that the language normally reserved for international relations and international conflicts is increasingly being used to describe conflicts within nations—among citizens and their fellow citizens who live in or attempt to take shelter in their neighborhoods? In order to begin to answer that question, we must first define the term "securitization" and its relationship to both emergency and crisis.

Defining Securitization

Securitization is a term first used by Ole Waever in 1995 to refer to the process by which a topic comes to be seen as a matter of national security, and becomes removed from the realm of "politics as usual" to instead be treated as extraordinary politics.¹⁹ Securitization is thus both a rhetorical device and a set of policies and practices that aim to transform both the content and the practice of politics in a particular sphere. The lens or language of securitization can be used to construct a problem as being "about security" when previously the same situation was "about politics" or even "about real estate," in the case of property squatting. (Here both security itself and the "referent object of security" are social constructs. There is no absolute definition of state security, nor is there any absolute way of understanding what threatens state security.) Issues that we have securitized in the twenty-first century thus include AIDS in Africa, migration policies, birth and natality issues in Western Europe and even environmental issues.

Securitization practices thus create what Aradau calls a mode of extraordinary practices. Here, the main assumption of the Copenhagen School of

analysis—whose analysts initially articulated the concept of securitization—is that “the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein ‘normal politics’ is bracketed.”²⁰ Once security is invoked, politicians and bureaucrats may abandon normal political practices such as open debate and deliberation, the calling of hearings or the formation of committees to study a problem and present findings and instead act to make sure that decisions are fast-tracked, and problems are confronted quickly and efficiently. In the process, public input may be regarded as less necessary and of lesser import. The move to securitize an issue thus raises both normative and ethical dilemmas. Didier Bigo in particular suggests that the “panic politics” of securitization can create a situation in which the relationship between the legislature and the citizens in a democracy is gravely threatened. In a crisis situation, he suggests that one of the few casualties is legislative accountability to citizens.²¹

Securitization can thus shut down a debate or indeed insure that one is never started, for as Aradau and van Munster note, rather than debate and deliberation, securitization calls for silence and speed.²² They argue that once an issue is framed as being “about security,” policies are more likely to be made by a small group of elites with outsiders unable to oppose or even oversee the legislation. This leads to an absence of public scrutiny.²³ And if the threat to the state is regarded as sufficiently grave, policymakers may adopt sweeping new legislation that might include the imposition of new taxes, conscription and the limitation of civil rights that might previously have seemed inviolable.²⁴ This is, in part, because decisions are more likely to be made by military or intelligence personnel, rather than publically elected officials—in a crisis situation.²⁵

Aradau also faults securitization practices for frequently relying on the creation of an enemy and even producing an enemy in order to garner support for a policy solution. In a crisis situation, there is a perception that no middle-of-the-road solution is feasible anymore, citizens and policymakers alike begin to think differently about risk and their risk tolerance becomes much lower. As a result they may be less willing to practice tolerance—to live alongside states (or neighbors) who are quite different than themselves, and they may be more likely to err on the side of caution, even if it means restricting minorities’ rights, for example, in a region.

The processes described here—the quick passage of legislation, a curtailment of public discussion on an issue and the creation of an enemy—can occur on both a national level (in, for example, the passage of the post-9/11 Patriot Act in the United States) and a local level (in, for example, putting up a fence around an apartment house or insisting that a guard check the passes of all who claim to live in the facility). As Neumann notes, one key indicator of whether an issue has become securitized is whether those involved are displaying fear and using language that augments or exhibits that fear. And as he notes, “Where there is fear, there should be IR scholars, for fear gives rise to policies, many of which are geared towards heightening security.”²⁶ Thus,

I believe that the issue of property squatting in Western Europe should be of interest to international relations scholars because it is “about security”—even if it is not about international politics but rather about policies and practices that are articulated within the state itself.

It is my contention that in recent years it is increasingly likely that citizens may perceive a threat (even a domestic threat) as being “about security” and will thus often turn to the state, asking it to take extraordinary measures to preserve them from that threat—whether it is the threat of invasion, the threat of disease or even a social threat to their community. Here I am not arguing that the world (or indeed one’s neighborhood) has actually become more dangerous or that some situations today should be dealt with through strong state intervention or the taking of extraordinary measures. The securitization paradigm suggests that there is little utility in arguing about whether a threat, as constituted, is “real.” Rather, what is important is the way in which threats are created, constructed or understood within a particular social, political and cultural context. However, I am suggesting that today it is likely that more issues—both foreign and domestic—will be approached through the lens of security, and that both the public and those in authority will be more likely to suggest that issues are related to state, individual and community security.²⁷

Securitization on the Local Level

I am not the first analyst to suggest that securitization can thus exist on a local as well as an international level. In her work on neighborhoods in South Africa, the geographer Charlotte Lemanski suggests that all urbanized citizens have experiences with security and security threats in their day-to-day lives. Citizens may even be empowered to take their own actions to safeguard their safety. As she notes, security problems exist on a variety of scales—and security and securitization can be constructed from the bottom up as well as from the top down.²⁸ More recently, McInnes and Rushton have described securitization as a multidimensional process that can be carried out on a variety of levels (local, state and international) as well as along a continuum, with some issues being more securitized than others. In addition, they suggest that issues can become both securitized and desecuritized over time.²⁹

In this way, to paraphrase Alexander Wendt, our neighbors—like the international system that he describes—become “what we make of them.” As citizens, we may choose to view those in our neighborhoods who are unlike ourselves as potential friends, business associates and marriage partners or we may choose to see them as enemies or as an existential threat to our way of life, depending on the lens with which we choose to view the problem. Thus, it is not surprising that in a globalizing world as well as a post-9/11 world, we can find evidence of securitization on a local level in a variety of Western European cities. Therefore, it is plausible to consider

how the squatter is constructed as a threat to the state, and the ways that these understandings structure state responses to the squatter. The squatter is constructed as a figure through speech acts uttered by officials who make housing policy, through media coverage of the issue of squatting and through judicial and legislative rulings that use language to describe the squatter and the issue of squatting. And not surprisingly in a Europe of open borders and a globalized world, we can also identify securitization rhetoric regarding property squatters that revolves around the presence of nonnative Others dwelling in one's midst and that calls for the state to mobilize resources against this perceived threat.

In this work, we trace the path by which securitization arose within local urban politics, with securitization logic being extended to produce an arena of housing security as a subset of social-cultural security. In doing so, it becomes clear that housing is an arena ripe for securitization because housing politics are so often really conversations about identity, culture and attachment to a place. Citizens throughout the world hold deep emotional attachments to their homes, which are not simply buildings but rather the repositories of feelings about who one is, where one belongs and the sort of community that one belongs to. (These feelings of attachment to home interact and overlap with larger feelings of attachment that citizens have to a homeland and their nation.) The ability to own a home of one's own appears in American popular culture as "the American dream," while for British citizens, there is an understanding that "a man's home is his castle." As I show in chapter 1, the home is the embodiment of deeply held values and principles—and it is viewed as a sanctuary, a fortress, an inheritance, the container for one's family as well as a symbol of one's past. Thus, it is not surprising that citizens are passionate about their attachment to a place, ready to defend it and willing to go to great lengths to assure the safety and security of their homes and neighborhoods—particularly when they perceive them as being under threat by non-European Others. As Albert and Buzan note, "societal or socio-cultural security is about the sustainability of collective identities."³⁰

In addition, housing policy is ripe for securitization because of the ways in which living in a neighborhood or a community has always produced practices of surveillance. As Charlotte Epstein argues, it is not surprising and perhaps inevitable that securitization would ultimately be practiced on the lowest levels—the level of the individual human body³¹ and the level of the home. Since 9/11, in both Europe and the United States we have seen governments and private firms devoting an increased budget share to training for and carrying out counterterrorism measures that seek to preempt the growth of a previously identified security threat. In many sectors, we have seen an increase in practices that seek to predict which types of citizens and groups might pose the greatest security threat—for example, through a reliance on profiling. At the same time, we have seen an increased share of government funds devoted to establishing and carrying out practices of surveillance—from the monitoring of telephone and internet conversations

by those suspected of being or becoming terror threats, to the use of CCTV in both public places and neighborhoods, throughout the UK in particular. Once neighborhood politics and the danger of squatters become viewed as a matter of national security, it is likely that surveillance practices of all types will increase on the local level. The home, which we regard as a place of privacy, sanctity and safety, or a sanctuary from the stressors of public life, risks becoming just another site where individuals are monitored, ostensibly for the public good. It is even possible that citizens will become more comfortable participating in surveillance themselves—and there is some evidence that this is true—watching to see if individuals in their neighborhoods are engaging in illegal occupations or strange comings and goings. It is difficult to see how one can build neighborhood communities when individuals view their neighbors as potential security threats, watch them carefully and, in some instances, report them to the authorities. In his work on surveillance, Torin Monahan speaks of the creation of a new type of citizen whom he labels the "insecurity subject." Such an individual is the subject of increased monitoring himself, and may himself engage in increased monitoring of his surroundings, his neighbors and their activities. As securitization becomes the norm in more and more sectors of society in more and more places, citizens everywhere begin to adopt a new identity—in which they are asked to view the world through the lens of securitization, and in the process thinking differently about themselves, their neighbors and their surroundings. The provision of security becomes not only the job of the government but also of each citizen, thereby definitely breaking the inside-outside distinction as security becomes, in a sense, everyone's job everywhere.³²

And, as Aradau notes, in each sector where securitization occurs there are also new classes of so-called security professionals who have specific know-how and technology to sell or lend to the problem.³³ Such individuals or corporations may be skilled at framing their particular issue as one that threatens the security and even the survival of institutions within that sector. As Aradau notes, "to securitize, actors come up with statistics, relate them, and establish the 'truth on scientific bases' concerning immigration and other societal problems such as organized crime, AIDS or human trafficking."³⁴ Experts produce knowledge about the subject, which is then used to shore up a particular interpretation of the problem as it exists, as well as the policy solutions that are then put forth to confront the problem.

In the case of property squatting, specialists have provided new knowledge on numbers of break-ins and the difficulties of eviction and then have gone on to create new classes of products and services for sale to those who are concerned about squatting. Here we can point to the creation of new types of antisquatter insurance policies that homeowners may purchase. Such policies promise to reimburse homeowners for repair costs they encounter as a result of having their property damaged, as well as legal costs they may encounter in evicting squatters from their property. Risk experts provide businesses with advice on preventing squatting, while security personnel

provide armed guards to secure both individual and corporate properties that are in danger of being squatted as a consequence of being left empty. Here, it appears to be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the citizen observer may conclude that the mere existence of such services means that squatting is a serious problem that the state must quickly deploy resources to defeat—even if he himself has no personal experience with or need to fear squatters or squatting. Thus, the “mercenary” who lends himself out to provide security can find employment either abroad or in downtown London, since the security environment is now being portrayed as similar and similarly threatening.

The Upside and the Downside of Securitization

Here one might ask why such securitization is problematic at all. If individuals feel safer within their gated enclaves and new private security firms are doing their jobs well, then why should anyone object to these new developments? However, I contend that increased securitization of housing policy is problematic for three reasons.

First, the securitization of housing policy represents an extension of the state of emergency and politics of exceptionality to yet more sectors of life in society today—including the tendency for security politics to no longer be practiced just on an international, regional (European) or even a national level. Securitization of housing issues thus represents a burrowing down of security issues to even the lowest levels of politics—the local level. This is the level most associated with direct democracy. (Here we can point to institutions such as early New England town meetings, the politics of homeowners’ associations and even the Athenian city-state to show how citizens have exercised their rights within a democracy to participate in decision making in their communities.)³⁵ Writing presciently in 2002, Didier Bigo described securitization politics as resembling a Möbius strip with no clear inside and outside, as the lines between external security and internal security, and the politics of external and internal threat management became increasingly blurred.³⁶ In this way, the burrowing down of securitization politics to the local level poses the possibility of a loss of sovereignty, as local officials are urged or even forced to cede more of their decision-making authority to federal authorities, both those who are elected and those who are appointed.

As Barry Buzan argued in 1997, the state has become increasingly powerful, with the influence of the state creeping into more and more aspects of individuals’ personal and private lives.³⁷ Surveillance practices that were unthinkable in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, are now commonplace. And many types of disputes within society are now being examined and treated through the lens of criminality and security as the referent objects of security have expanded and changed.³⁸ Most recently, the analyst Nadine Voelkner has adopted a Foucaultian perspective to describe the changing role of the state in an increasingly globalized world. In her work on disease and

pathogenic security, she argues that states today no longer seek to control their borders as much as they seek to control the circulation of objects, ideas and people that seek to move into and out of their borders. In her work, she relies on Bennett’s definition of globalization as “a state of affairs in which the Earth (globe or world) is taken as a whole within which various parts—human and nonhuman—now circulate.”³⁹ According to this logic, one can argue that the state now seeks both to better police and control the liminal space of the squats that exist within their borders, and simultaneously seeks to control the transient squatters who travel throughout Europe in search of empty spaces to occupy—sometimes bringing with them social problems or dangerous social philosophies like anarchism.

Furthermore, since the politics of exceptionality requires the creation of an enemy in order to present a justification for practicing crisis politics, extending securitization to the local level changes how citizens view their neighbors, including those who are different from themselves. A politics of exclusion is therefore more likely on all levels of society. As Williams suggests, in considering the growth of securitization in the modern age, the most important questions to ask are: What is being secured? And what is it being secured from?⁴⁰ In answering this question on the local level, we find that increasingly the city or neighborhood is being secured from those who are different because they are seen as threatening to societal security or identity. As a result of the creation of crisis politics within the community, even local politics is now practiced with greater secrecy, greater speed and less broad deliberation—and those who are different are even more likely to be left out of the community. (This may be described as a small price to pay in order to guarantee safety and reduce risks.) It is not mere coincidence thus that just as Europe’s nations have turned from a politics of multiculturalism to one that focuses instead on the burden and responsibilities of assimilation as practiced by the newcomer, so has securitization language arisen in the neighborhoods and communities that house the newcomers.

Securitization and the “War on Squatting”

To come full circle from the introduction then, it becomes clear that property squatting in Western European capitals today needs to be examined not as a problem of political economy or through the sociological lens of deviance. Instead, we can learn much about the problem itself and the way in which states have acted to handle the problem through considering it as a problem of security. Discussions in the media and by politicians about Europe’s squat problem have—along with legislation—served to move squatting from the status of public nuisance to grave security threat in the years since 2001. The measures enacted—and the ways they were enacted—suggest that property squatting was securitized in many nations, including England, France, Netherlands and Denmark. In each instance we can see a new timeline evolving, in which measures to cope with property squatting—particularly urban

property squatting and squatting engaged in by nonnationals of the country in question—passed quickly with a minimum of public debate. The debates that we would expect to see about human rights, including the right to housing, were absent. In some places, public protests against the legislation were quickly broken up by police personnel. Large-scale public information campaigns promoted the government's view regarding the dangers of squatting. In this way, a cultural practice that persisted happily for over fifty years—and that often has deep roots in a culture, stretching back to the 1300s in the case of Britain—was redefined and rigidly controlled overnight.

In his work, Stritzel speaks of “securitization logic,” or a “universal grammar,” which renders all issues that have become securitized as alike. Once an object problem or group becomes the object of securitization, the procedure for making policy is remarkably similar.⁴¹ He argues that it doesn't matter to a large extent which nation is enacting the pageant of security, nor do the names or specific identities of the actors themselves matter. The relationship constructed between policymakers, the public and the object of security remains the same, with each set of actors playing their parts according to the same script.

In this work, Stritzel's argument is extended to demonstrate that the securitization pageant operates the same on both an international and a domestic level. Actions taken against property squatters—such as slum clearing and the deportation of foreign squatters—represent new types of exceptional actions taken by the state for reasons of public security. Analysts have previously examined the politics of slum clearance in the developing world, focusing on the ways in which slum clearing is justified on the grounds of health security since slums are seen as places of infestation and disease. However, as Aguilera points out, in conceptualizing the slum or squat as an unruly place, the assumption is that the *squat itself* is a threat that exists within a developing country. The squat becomes an extension of the chaos and ungovernability that might be associated with the state or region as a whole.⁴² However, what is unusual about the Western European situation is the notion that such pockets of ungovernability and chaos might exist within the *modern* state.

In addition, what is unusual about European antisquatting legislation is the attempt to securitize the issue by making reference to some characteristics of the squatters themselves—rather than the chaotic nature of the space that they occupy. Squatters in general and multinational property squatters in particular are described in terms that make reference to terrorism, liminality and the danger presented by unregistered and unsupervised citizens residing in the capital cities within one's borders, rather than on the grounds of health. Thus, the squatter himself—rather than the practice of squatting or the squat itself—is demonized.

Here, state interests are served both by demonizing property squatters—particularly foreign property squatters—and by redefining the squatting issue as one of national security. Estimates suggest that the squatter population has grown worldwide since 2007 in the developed and developing world due to adverse economic effects, widening income inequalities and the

bank bailouts and foreclosure crises. Today, cities like Reykjavik in Iceland and Helsinki in Finland boast large and well-known squats. A UK-based web site for landlords reprints figures from a squatter group that suggests that since the 1970s, approximately 250,000 people have “squared” in Britain.⁴³ And Britain's Ministry of Justice acknowledges that squatting has doubled in Britain since the beginning of the 2008 recession, mostly because of the vast increase in the numbers of empty and unoccupied homes.⁴⁴ And within the increasing numbers of property squatters one can also identify increasing numbers of foreign squatters within the nations of Europe. These new squatters are coming from EU member nations and nations in Eastern Europe, as well as from former colonies, in the case of Africa. Statistics from the UK's Department of Communities and Local Government indicate that in 2012, 52 percent of the homeless sleeping on the streets (or sleeping rough) in London were foreign, with 28 percent from other Western European countries.⁴⁵

The ability of European citizens in particular to move from one European nation to another for employment-related purposes has spawned a culture of squatter settlements in both urban and rural areas throughout Europe. While some of the squatters are individuals belonging to groups (like Irish Travelers or East European gypsies) who were traditionally nomadic, other individuals were also added to the mix—including East European workmen squatting in England, and students from throughout Europe squatting in their home countries or abroad. Here, as Guild notes, EU nationals wanting to enter other EU nations are permitted to do so according to the Schengen cooperation agreements—though they must register if they wish to stay for longer than three months. Those who do not have the proper documents (including proof that they have a job in the host country) are not eligible to register for social benefits, such as social housing and health care in the host nation. These are the individuals thus most likely to end up homeless, either “sleeping rough” on the streets or squatting in abandoned properties. It is relatively difficult to expel homeless EU nationals from one's nation. The only legitimate grounds for expelling EU nationals are “the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”⁴⁶ Thus, it is easy to see the appeal of redefining property squatting as a matter of national security.

And in each case examined (the Netherlands, France, the UK and Denmark) the increase in international property squatters occurred within an environment in which multiculturalism was increasingly giving way to assimilationist tendencies within immigration circles and in which anti-immigrant sentiments among citizens were on the rise, largely as a backlash against economic downturns. In simple terms, in many nations squatters are no longer viewed as objects of charity, requiring care and kindness—but instead as a threat to national identity and national security. Thus, today's social and political conversation about squatting—at least in Europe—is no longer merely “about” real estate. Rather, it is about questions of identity: who belongs in our community and who does not? What should our community look like?⁴⁷

Securitization logic also explains why, although property squatting was formerly considered a local issue to be handled by neighborhood associations, local police and local politicians in recent years, squatter policy has become the subject of national-level policy making and often international-level policy making as well. Indeed, with the advent of globalization and the increased mobility of citizens, resources and capital, many analysts have begun to question the rigid distinction that is so often made between politics and the political process within and outside the state. Agnew speaks of a process of "deterritorialization" occurring within security politics—describing a decoupling of security from the state and an undermining of the notion of the state as a territorial container.⁴⁸ Here, the advent of practices such as asymmetric warfare and terrorist attacks on civilians within states means that the language and practices of security are being increasingly applied by local politicians, by local police forces and by the media in discussing local threats. Thus, in the years since 9/11, many analysts have begun to suggest that this "universal grammar of security" is now being enacted in more and more sectors of society, both within the international system and within the state itself. Here, Albert and Buzan provide a list of five sectors that have become securitized—pointing to the realms of economic security, military security, environmental security, political security and societal or social-cultural security.⁴⁹ Thus, we can now frame arguments describing a crisis occurring in the housing sector as one that calls for a marshaling of resources, a speedy solution to a problem and often the imposition of draconian measures to fend off a perceived threat. As a result politics in a so-called global city in a climate of globalization may no longer be local politics. That distinction between the orderly politics inside the polity and the high-stakes politics outside the polity no longer holds. As I show in chapter 1, defending the state and defending the city are now closely related—particularly when the identities of the "enemies" now closely overlap.

Here Table i.1 lists all of the actors that have come to play a part in formulating and implementing policies regarding urban squatters in France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK in the past ten years. As the chart shows, these actors include international or regional (European) actors, including nongovernmental organizations and transnational actors. In addition, they include national-level agencies, politicians and parliaments. And finally, they include local actors, such as the neighbors of the squatters, the squatter organizations themselves and local politicians.

As the case studies in this work show, the making of antisquatter policy became the job of a new group of actors, including security professionals. Most of these actors—France's minister of the interior, Britain's minister of justice, the Red Cross, the European Court of Justice and the United Nations high commissioner for refugees—are not local, but rather national and international actors. Thus, what was previously regarded as a nuisance and a local problem has now become the object of policy making at the highest levels of government.

Table i.1 Actors Involved in Squatting in Western Europe

International/regional actors	UN HCR
	International Red Cross
	European Court of Justice
	Roma Congress
National actors	Department of Interior
	Department of Justice
	National newspapers
	Parliament
	President/prime minister
Local actors	Mayors
	Local newspapers
	Neighbours
	Homeowners' associations
	Squatter organizations

In addressing issues related to the existence of property squats and property squatters within the borders of France, England, the Netherlands and Denmark, the issue thus becomes one of global governance. Legal rulings that might be referenced as the aforementioned actors attempt to regulate and respond to challenges of existing squats include the 1985 Schengen Agreement; the agreements created between France and the UK to regulate the activities of squatters in the port of Calais, France; the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights issued by the European Parliament; judicial rulings of the European Court of Human Rights; the UN Human Rights Charter; and rulings by the Council of Europe on the rights of the Roma. In addressing the right to squat, legal scholars and policy analysts have had to address related issues regarding the right to housing, the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and the rights of nomadic peoples like the Roma. In situations in which leaders deported squatters who were in the country illegally, separate legal rulings have addressed the authority of the state to deport these individuals. In this way, a local issue—there is a property squatter or group of property squatters in the home next to me—quickly becomes a national, a regional (Europe-wide) and often an international issue. Finally, in instances in which squatters were attacked, legal authorities have intervened on behalf of migrant or transient squatters. (For example, in Italy, Roma settlements were the victims of arson.)⁵⁰

Two Visions of the Neighborhood Today

Sophie Body-Gendrot uses an idea borrowed from mathematics to describe what she terms the “fractalization” in security policy today. She notes that in a fractal figure all of the parts that make up the object have the same shape or structure as the whole, albeit on a different scale. (She gives us the examples of snowflakes or tree branches.)⁵¹ Thus, one might expect to see the federal institutions of security reproduced on a local level, and the conversations about state security also reproduced on a local level. While states may fear the spread of chaos from a neighboring failed state, local officials may worry about the existence of squatter settlements within their borders, fearing that here too chaos may spread to other neighboring regions. It should be noted here that this is not a new problem—but rather one that is somewhat new for politicians in the West or the developed world. Scholars who write about slums, housing and development have long argued that the existence of large swaths of unregulated housing and unregulated people provides an obstacle to development. Here, they cite the likely destabilization that may occur as the result of uneven development that may exacerbate class differences, creating a class of those who are extremely wealthy alongside a class of those who are destitute.⁵² Here we can identify ideas related to globalization that are writ both large and small, through comparing the security discourses and security practices of the neighborhood and the state.

While using the language of securitization to describe neighborhood politics might thus seem like a good “fit” for politicians and citizens, there are reasons why one should worry about this development. Constructivist analysts in particular have long argued that language does not merely describe an existing reality as much as it can serve to structure or create that reality. Albert and Buzan note that:

In the social world, the structure of social reality and the way it is observed and described are inextricably intertwined. If something comes to be seen primarily as a “political,” an “economic,” a “military” issue and so on, which before had primarily been seen as something else, then this can both signal and lead to a change in the way social reality is structured.⁵³

That is, security language when it appears in newspapers or on Sunday morning talk shows and when it appears frequently can actually change the ways in which citizens throughout Europe begin to think about their neighbors, their neighborhoods and the policies that they wish their states to adopt in dealing with neighborhood problems. People who did not previously fear property squatters may begin to do so, and individuals may begin to perceive their neighborhoods as under siege or in danger from foreign squatters—even if previously they were not worried about these developments.

In this work, I warn about some of the dangers that accrue from the increasing tendency of politicians and news analysts to use security language to describe an ever larger number of activities and problems. This extension

of securitization language to yet more spheres has negative effects upon the polity—for the growth of democratization and citizen participation since a politics of emergency is fundamentally incompatible with a politics of democracy. Secondly, as noted, the extension of securitization language to the sphere of housing policy has negative effects both upon the squatters themselves and upon their neighbors. Squatters are more likely to be demonized and disempowered, while neighbors are more likely to begin to see their neighborhood in terms of barriers to be defended and a simplistic enemy/friend dichotomy. Finally, extending securitization language to describe the squatting issue today serves to close off the conversation, thus limiting the types of strategies considered acceptable and unacceptable in dealing with the phenomenon. As Neumann notes in his essay on the methodology of discourse analysis, a discourse can serve as a sort of blueprint whose purpose is to structure a conversation about a problem. Discourse is thus powerful because as he states:

(Discourse) constrains how the stuff that the world consists of is ordered and so how people categorize and think about the world. It constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible and what is thought of as the “natural thing” to do in a given situation . . . it produces preconditions for action.⁵⁴

Discussion of squatting as a security problem—rather than a social problem or a failure by the state to provide housing—thus affects what policy solutions are likely to be examined in dealing with squatting, who is likely to be blamed for the problem and what practices are viewed as possible within that system. Securitization language problematizes both squatting practices and the squatter him- or herself, as well as making a punitive, strong state solution to the problem more likely.

That is, we can identify two different narratives: one that views squatting as a form of nascent citizenship, and one that portrays squatting as a form of antistate activity. Each narrative relies on a different construction of both the squatter and the squat. Table i.2 summarizes the two different sets of policy prescriptions—exclusionary and inclusionary—that flow from the two narratives. Each set of policies rests on different assumptions about what squatting is, the relationship between the squatter and the polity, and the character and orientation of those who squat. Table i.2 delineates those differences. This chart presents inclusion and exclusion strategies, thus, as two ideal types. In reality, it is unlikely that a state’s policy towards squatting will be a pure expression of only inclusion or only exclusion. Instead these policies can be seen as existing on a continuum, with states swinging like a pendulum from the embrace of exclusionist or inclusionist strategies over time—depending on the existence of other security threats within the polity, and the place of the state within the international community. States might also have a mixed strategy. The states of Western Europe in particular have

Table i.2 Two Sets of Policies towards Squatting

	Inclusionist	Exclusionist
Squatting as practice represents	• First rung on property ladder • Bid for acceptance in society • Lower state of political, social, economic development • <i>Legitimate</i> response to social problems in housing sphere	• Threat to existing community • Anti-social behavior • <i>Illegitimate</i> response
Orientation of accepting polity	• Multicultural • Open • Adaptive	• Mono-ethnic • Closed • Fixed
State's desired objective	• Inclusion of squatters into community • <i>Situation</i> is problematized	• Defense of community from squatters • <i>Squatter</i> is problematized
Characterization of squatter by elites	• Nascent citizen • Able, willing to adapt • Identity is malleable, not fixed	• Security threat: untrustworthy • Social distance: too ethnically, culturally different to adapt • Identity is fixed
Perceived ideology of squatter	• Pre-democratic • Incrementalist	• Antistate orientation, dangerous • Revolutionary
Agency of squatter	<i>Victim</i> of housing crisis, economy, economic circumstances	Empowered individual who <i>chooses</i> squatting
Likelihood of assimilation of squatters	High (inevitable?)	Low
Strategies, overtures by elites	• Privatization of squats • Employment schemes	• "Containment of squatters": borders, fortifications • Punitive • Security oriented • Criminalization
Strategies, overtures by citizens	Cooperation with squatter charity	NIMBY
Government actions	Amnesty Extension of social welfare and benefits	Slum clearing Deportation of international squatters

had a somewhat schizophrenic approach to the issue of property squatting, for government policy has alternately embraced and outlawed the practice of squatting—giving rise to two different sets of policies for regulating the practice over time.

In some instances, property squatters (including Roma) were described as barbaric. Language used in the popular press when describing the problem of squatting often emphasizes the ways in which property squatters and the property squat are dirty, dangerous and unsafe. In the words of Mary Douglas, the language of purity and defilement is used.⁵⁵ Here, the fear is that those living in a neighborhood will somehow be contaminated by the presence of squatters. The only solution is thus shutting down squats, using violence if necessary. The social distance created thus provides a justification for processes like slum clearing, since those who are different are presented as dangerous—particularly if they are foreign.

At the same time, there has always persisted a separate mythology about squatting—based both on religious and folk attitudes. Within a Judeo-Christian worldview, land can be seen first and foremost as belonging to God, with individuals, families and corporations having only a limited claim upon it. Historically, some theologians and politicians have interpreted the passage in the Old Testament Book of Leviticus in particular, which describes the Year of Jubilee that occurs every fifty years and results in a type of land distribution, as being a statement in favor of commonly held lands and egalitarian land distribution. As Helen Hayward notes, radical agrarian movements within Britain have historically made use of this understanding in advocating for a variety of different schemes. She notes that groups like the Diggers and the Levelers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries opposed the payment of taxes or tithes for the privilege of living on church-held lands, based on the argument that the concentration of land in a few hands was both unjust and inequitable.⁵⁶ In addition, Colin Ward calls our attention to the tradition of the "one night house," a sort of folk understanding that an individual who builds a house under cover of darkness on unclaimed land may legally be permitted to do so.⁵⁷ In this view, squatting thus becomes the bottom rung of the property ladder, with laws such as the right of adverse possession allowing a citizen who adds his labor to the land, in some instances, to win legal title to that land. In Ward's work he likewise suggests that many current citizens are actually descended from early property squatters and that squatting is both an important democratic tradition as well as a common fix for market inequities such as a land shortage.⁵⁸ This thread runs through British history, with individuals like Thomas Spence and William Wilberforce making arguments about the justice and inequity of land-tenure forms. Thus, within Britain in particular (as well as in France), there was limited public and elite support for schemes that would distribute land equally among citizens.⁵⁹

However, the growth of securitization language in discussing squatting in the past ten years has caused the pendulum to swing once again between

the two approaches—away from a situation in which the property squatter might be viewed as a potential new neighbor and new citizen, to one in which the squatter is viewed as not quite human and therefore lacking in the rights and privileges of “decent society.” The use of security language or security discourse increases the likelihood that the state will adopt an exclusionist orientation towards property squatting. In the present day, property squatting is thus more likely to be tackled from an exclusionary perspective (which emphasizes the question: how might I secure my property from squatters?) rather than an inclusionary perspective (which might ask the question: how is it that people similar to ourselves were left out of the neighborhoods of our polity, and how might they be brought back in?). The danger here is that society as a whole will become more divided and polarized if an exclusionary perspective is adopted on the squatting issue. In order to explore this idea more fully, we must step back and examine the problem from a historic perspective.

Inclusion and Exclusion: Embracing the Squatter

At some periods in the history of the state, squatting was viewed through an inclusionist lens. State policies have operated on the assumption that squatting represents the lowest rung on the property ladder. The preferred state is one of being settled, and those who are not settled but nomadic are regarded as deviant. However, the assumption is that squatting is merely a temporary problem associated with economic transition, rather than a permanent identity. For this reason, squatter slums are often referred to as “informal settlements”⁶⁰—with the implied notion that they can eventually be converted (or institutionalized in the words of Hans Pruijt⁶¹) into formal settlements. As development continues, analysts argue, informal settlements will be absorbed into formal mechanisms as states become more modernized and better at administering their citizens.⁶²

Inclusionist state policy also assumes that those who squat have a right to do so, and they are not to be regarded with suspicion but with compassion. Here, discourse focuses on the ways in which squatters are not practicing citizenship correctly and how they are violating many of the norms that long-time citizens take for granted regarding how one lives in a neighborhood. Nonetheless, the implication is that given the right set of conditions, property squatters may be socialized and transformed and eventually assimilated into the community. Squatters are thus acknowledged as political actors and human beings who are capable of practicing politics and eventually claiming the rights and privileges that other citizens enjoy.

The assumption is that no one squats unless he is forced to by dire economic circumstances such as poverty, and that the squatter's goal is not to damage the state or the neighborhood but merely to provide for the survival of him- or herself and his or her family in the only way possible. Here, both Aguilera and Pruijt suggest that precarious individuals in particular

are often “coopted” into the system and their situation may become institutionalized.⁶³ A member of a squatter community might even be absorbed into the leadership within the neighborhood, region or city. In this model, squatters are not “outside the system” because they wish to be outside but rather because they weren't invited in and no one attempted to include them. Here the state may also acknowledge some degree of complicity or guilt for creating the conditions that led to a housing shortage for socially vulnerable members. Indeed, the state may tacitly or openly agree to look the other way when confronted with squatting practices, and over time the state may even begin to make overtures towards squatters with a view towards gradually legalizing their position and integrating them into society. In the inclusionist policy, squatting thus provides a “way in” for nascent citizens to gradually adopt the full mantle of citizenship in their neighborhoods and cities.

Historically and even recently, squatting was a reasonable way of acquiring or even demanding to be let into a community. In this view, the squatter's identity was not fixed but impermanent. The identity of both the squatter and the larger community changed or adapted. The squatter could become a genuine member of society, and society could remain open to embrace and accept squatters. As Ward shows in his history of squatting in Britain, folk traditions allowed an outsider to claim the right to establish a residence and in that way to claim status within society. Ward describes the mythology and norms that arose governing the building of dwellings by residents in Britain beginning with the Middle Ages. Here he describes the institution of the “one night” house—which is based on the social understanding that a dwelling that is put up within the span of one night (or in some instances built only after dark) can serve to establish a claim on both the residence and the land on which it resides by the builder. He describes this belief as mythological or magical, and goes on to note that many villages in Britain have a historic “squatter” house that eventually became legitimized by local definitions of squatter's rights. One can find the one-night house myth in the cultures of Latin America, in Turkey and elsewhere throughout Europe.⁶⁴ A variant of this inclusionist view also be found in James Holston's writing about “insurgent citizenship” in Brazil, in which he notes that marginalized citizens have often organized informally to wrest property and eventually citizenship from the entrenched interests that were loath to share.⁶⁵ In addition, the British organization Homeless International uses the language of inclusion to describe the ways in which India's Pavement Dwellers are working within Mumbai's Society of the Promotion of Area Sources Centers (SPARC) to create housing cooperatives leading to the full inclusion of pavement dwellers within India's social, economic and political life.⁶⁶

Both as individual actors, actors within a state and as transnational actors, squatters have often thus articulated a desire to join the existing capitalist system, and to be granted rights and privileges within the existing system (versus espousing a desire to transform or convert the existing system to something else—such as an anarchic society or a socialist or communist

scheme of property ownership). Inclusion strategies are thus assimilationist, and the transformation from squatter or pavement dweller to productive citizen is thus seen as inevitable. In other words, all that is lacking for these individuals to become homeowners (and productive citizens) is a home.

In both narratives—that of insurgent citizenship and that of the extension of housing franchise—policy analysts see squatters as a force that ultimately can seek to shore up rather than to undermine the state. Despite the use of the term “insurgent citizenship,” squatters are not really seen as insurgents—since they do not seek to overturn or destroy the state, but rather to be embraced by the state and to have a role within the state. (However, analysts may differ about the role of agency—whether citizenship and housing rights need be wrested away from the dominant class, or whether they might simply be extended through government policies.)

Thus, assimilation strategies rest on the assumption that every squatter is a nascent citizen, desiring to move beyond his or her rootless or unsettled status. In this narrative, over time, the squat dweller acquires both legitimacy in the eyes of his neighbors and a stake in the community. The chaotic and primitive landscape of the squat gives way to the civilized laying down of streets and alleys. Both the squatter and his dwelling evolve towards the norms of the community. Gradually, over time he becomes both a legal resident and a member of the community. He moves from the position of a threatening, marginalized outsider to occupy a place in the community. He accepts community norms and fulfills his responsibilities in the community—rather than remaining forever marginalized in his substandard house. As Ward describes the logic:

Favorable circumstances can enable those overnight adventurers to form communities that evolve in about fifteen years into fully-serviced suburbs, providing livelihoods as well as homes, through people's ability to turn their Labor into capital. This is something that neither government nor the market economy can do for the least influential of citizens.⁶⁷

He describes the ways in which the dwellings themselves lose their strange angles and peculiar character. Over time, the squatters paint their houses the same color as those of their compatriots and gradually the house is absorbed into the larger milieu of the community. Ward suggests that the logic of property ownership is transformative—it literally changes who people are.⁶⁸ Thus, the threat that the squatter presents is gradually reduced and the squatter himself is disarmed through a process of socialization. Gradually he is incorporated into the community, and becomes a means of support for the community and protection, rather than an outside threat.

The assimilationist or inclusionist narrative thus assumes that even the squatter can become part of the capitalist system if his labor can be harnessed on behalf of that system. (Squatting is thus the first rung on the property ladder.) He may aspire to citizenship and come in voluntarily, or his actions may be harnessed or captured by the state. He can serve as a resource for the

state if, for example, his actions can be used to force a correction to market mechanisms. Assimilationist strategies against squatting may thus involve the extension of amnesty to those in squats so that they can invoke legal claims towards the property without fear of facing criminal penalties for squatting. Other strategies may include paid squatting schemes in which squatters receive a fee for occupying homes and businesses that otherwise might be vacant—thus providing on-site security and protection against vandalism and decay. Strategies might also include legal and economic mechanisms for converting squats themselves into state-sanctioned or private legal housing. Thus, for example, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, nations including Great Britain and the Netherlands invoked schemes in which property squatters were induced to squat “on behalf of” the government, and force a correction in the market system.⁶⁹ The plan was to harness the squatter threat to entice or compel landlords to complete their renovations quickly and get their properties back on the market lest they be squatted while vacant!⁷⁰ Similarly, media reports and government policy papers often report favorably about the British group Shelter, which grew out of citizen activism in the post-World War II period. Here, poor families organized to claim unoccupied buildings and to demand that the government provide more social housing. Today, Shelter urges Britain's government to address property squatting through use of strategies such as appointing the homeless to serve as “property guardians,” occupying and maintaining dwellings that are abandoned or empty, or involving the homeless in short-life housing schemes. The Great London Council's Squatters' amnesty in 1977–1978 similarly encouraged squatters to come out of the shadows and to work out arrangements with the city to take legal tenancy of properties they occupied.⁷¹ In each case, the aim overall is to convert squatting into lawful tenancy and engagement in the mainstream. Within the inclusionist narrative, squatting is thus regarded as a strategy of incrementalism in which citizenship is gradually won, rather than a transformative or revolutionary strategy of squatters whose aims are to overthrow capitalism or democracy.

Inclusionist practices are not always successful, however. This is because they rest on two assumptions that may not always hold. First, they assume that squatters themselves wish to assimilate culturally and ethnically into the polity as a whole, and that the polity is able and willing to accept them as part of itself. Next, they assume that squatters wish to assimilate politically and economically into the polity as a whole in such a way as to help prop up or support the state, rather than wishing to tear down the state and start anew. In Western Europe, policymakers often seem confused by the Roma organizations that do not wish to become assimilated into long-term dwellings and a settled life. Assimilation or inclusion may also fail if the group that the state is seeking to include harbors a radically different vision of its future, one that rests on a desire to overthrow the existing system rather than to work within it. In this case, an out-group may refuse overtures from the mainstream towards assimilation and elites may be forced to change their strategy towards squatters as a result. We can see the tensions between inclusion and exclusion

in the events of the late 1960s in London. At this time, a number of squatter organizations entered into negotiations with the government in an attempt to resolve the issues of urban homelessness and poverty. In particular, the British organization Shelter evolved a friendly relationship with the government. But many involved in the 1969 actions, including Ron Bailey, founder of the more radical organization known as the London Squatter's Campaign, felt that Shelter had betrayed the squatting movement through aligning with the government and as a result was too willing to compromise and be patient. Bailey's group faulted Shelter because of the fact that it did not see capitalism or government as the problem, whereas the London Squatter Campaign did. In an interview, Bailey noted that "We hoped that our small actions would set off a movement on a large scale with others inspired to challenge the government." His more radical antistate movement worked with and was inspired by the International Socialist Worker's movement.⁷²

As noted, the assumption of the assimilationist/inclusionist strategy is that no one actually chooses to squat but that squatting is rather a last-resort strategy of the truly disempowered. For that reason, inclusionist strategies do not include a mechanism for situations like the one just mentioned, in which disaffected youths in Europe appeared to be choosing squatting not out of a necessity, but because it appealed to them intellectually, ethically and politically. Today, in particular, the anarchist squatter represents a threat because he does not accept societal norms regarding property rights, thus posing a threat to preexisting institutions like private property. These individuals have described themselves as "taking possession" as a protest of the capitalist ideology of private property.⁷³

Assimilationist or inclusionist practices, however, might fail not because of characteristics of the squatters themselves, but rather because of characteristics of the state that is formulating policies to deal with squatting. In particular, inclusionist practices are unlikely to be embraced or adopted in situations in which those on top (including neighbors and national and local policymakers) are unable to envision a particular group as capable of being assimilated over time.

Historically, we can identify periods in which squatting (and squatters) were viewed through an exclusionist lens, in which those who almost belonged to society were merely tolerated (and sometimes not even that), but were kept at arm's length from the community as a whole. In this model, squatters may be acknowledged as living on the fringes of society but are not regarded as nascent citizens. Squatting is seen here not as a constructive strategy for claiming citizenship, but rather as a regressive and dangerous practice. In this view, citizenship does not naturally evolve in a more inclusionist direction, as franchise and housing are extended to more and more individuals. Rather in the exclusionist model the community is regarded as permanently closed. It has a static identity that cannot adapt to receive all comers. In this paradigm, the assumption by the homeowner is that one's property and one's rights are something to be defended from outsiders. In his work on the development and evolution of American foreign policy,

the analyst Campbell notes that states produce their national identities through a discourse of security and insecurity, and through drawing boundaries between the inside and the outside of the state.⁷⁴ Similarly, one can argue that neighborhoods can also produce their own identities, in part through drawing distinctions between themselves and those who live elsewhere. Here the neighborhood is not a laboratory or school for citizenship but rather a type of territory to be defended, as well as the bedrock on which in-group and out-group identities are created. The exclusionist view thus seeks to defend the interests of those who are firmly entrenched, through the building of enclaves and restrictive covenants that seek to defend the borders as they are. In this view, national (and residential) identities rest on drawing lines of difference and distinction between one's own nation and neighboring nations, or one's own neighborhood and the ones that border it. Living in a home in a particular neighborhood might represent a homeowner's strategy to separate himself and his family from "others"—those who are different culturally, economically, ethnically or socially. And defending one's neighborhood or home can thus take on racial overtones if homeowners band together against what they see as events or individuals that threaten to change their neighborhood's profile or identity.

Inclusion and Exclusion: Rejecting the Squatter

Exclusionist strategies thus view the social distance between settled homeowners and squatters as much greater and can even be implicated in the creation of that social distance. In essence, exclusionist strategies perceive a line (or in some cases create a line) between the two groups that cannot be crossed. Squatters do not become citizens, and neighborhoods do not undergo transformation in order to include squatters. In his work *Homo Sacer*, the analyst Agamben speaks of ways in which governments and citizens often think about those in camps—refugee camps, reservations for Native Americans or indigenous peoples, border and transition zones or jails in places like Guantanamo Bay. Agamben states that the camp "remains outside the normal order." Individuals who inhabit camps are seen not as citizens with rights but rather as purely the subjects of governance. Camps are thus "spaces of abjection." He suggests that policymakers often do not regard the inhabitants of these camps as fully human or like themselves.⁷⁵ For this reason, government policies to deal with groups in these camps may not necessarily allow for assimilation or settlement.

The exclusionist model allows us to see squatter settlements and squatter houses as a type of camp or space of abjection. Here squatter policy rests on accepting the notion that the squatter will never achieve citizenship or belonging because he or she is simply too different from his neighbors. He may be viewed as wholly other or not fully human. The practices and dwellings of squatters may be described as barbaric and filthy, and taboos may be invoked to create fear of the squatter, who may be regarded as unclean and thus a possible agent of contamination within the polity. He may be described

as a disease vector or a conduit for dangerous, anti-social ideas. Those who inhabit the space of the squat are not seen as displaying proper attributes of citizenship, and they are regarded as not properly integrated into public life—in part because they do not accept its norms and values.

Evidence of the abjectionist view appears in Richard Ballard's work on white South African's attitudes towards property squatters. In a series of interviews carried out in Johannesburg in 2004, Ballard showed that white South Africans shared a propensity to describe their neighborhoods as under siege or on the verge of invasion by property squatters. In his view, this discourse is implicitly one about modernity and about race. White South Africans describe a historic process of wresting land from a wild Africa and establishing an outpost of civilization. In looking at their own neighborhoods, they repeat this metaphor, describing their fears that they could somehow be "dragged backward" and "lose everything."⁷⁶ Property squatters thus represent a sort of primal, tribal threat. He notes that respondents frequently drew upon aspects of the squatter lifestyle (such as a shortage of public toilet facilities) to shore up their own notions of squatters as dirty and animalistic—rather than acknowledging the role that poverty or poor city planning might play in leading to these conditions. Here, the language of purity and defilement creates social distance between the suburbanites and the squatters—rather than merely reflecting a distance that already existed. The use of the purity and defilement framework thus operates to render the squatters themselves as inassimilable, incapable of simply being accepted into existing society and the subdivision, and creates justification for policy prescriptions based on the assumption that these squatters cannot simply be offered housing or a place in the community.

Our concepts of human rights are intimately related to our ability to conceptualize of what it is to be human, and our concepts of human rights rest upon those distinctions that we draw between who or what is human and who or what is not. Particularly today, the question of who is human and what it means to be human is fraught with tension and uncertainty. As Bruce Braun puts it:

Here in the United States, evening news broadcasts mess up the category even further: "barely human" others (Iraqis, Rwandans, and Muslims) and "almost human" companions (monkeys, dog an cats) are discussed alongside accounts of "inter-species" exchange (bird flu, SARS) in which the boundaries of the human are suddenly porous and mobile.⁷⁷

As analysts like Derrida and Agamben have noted, the notion of identity frequently rests on the drawing of borders or boundaries, between what I am and you are not.⁷⁸ That is, my identity and my humanity are fully realized and described only when they are highlighted or contrasted against the differences between my life and that of others. And, as Agamben notes, the drawing of these distinctions frequently rests on power dynamics. He notes that man is drawn as in contrast with "the slave, the barbarian and the foreigner,

as figures of an animal in human form."⁷⁹ As a recent editorial notes, identity frequently rests on the notion of distance. One's own identity as a human might, for example, be measured by looking at the distance between one's own life and that of animals or nonhuman life forms.⁸⁰

Similarly, one can argue that many of our modern forms within the city—such as neighborhoods or enclaves—are described largely in terms of what they exclude, or the distance that they establish between themselves and their neighbors. The identity ascribed to a place and by extension to its citizens rests on the fact that these dwellers in this place are somehow different than those who live beyond or outside its gates. Thus, the identities of the enclaves of the newly wealthy citizens of Beijing or Shanghai rest on a notion of what it means to be civilized and to live in a civilized environment, in contrast to what lies outside the gates. And the residents of these areas strive to delineate themselves, as residents of this place, from others who do not belong within its gates.

Thus, the squatter in particular represents a sort of transgressive figure—since his ultimate aim is to reside within the gates, but as an Other. He thus destroys the distance between the "civilized" dwellers of an enclave and those who reside outside (whether by choice or by act of conscious exclusion), by bringing the outside inside. And in this way, his very existence calls into question not only the identity of the place that he occupies, but also the identity of the other residents within the area. The squatter thus violates the original dwellers' notions of themselves as members of a certain social class, as members of a certain educational class or as members of a particular national group. In particular, when a squatter collective moves into a neighborhood in Hampstead Heath in London or another high-rent, high-class residential neighborhood, they violate the residents' own sacred understanding of what this place represents historically, in the narrative of Britain. A place associated, for example, with literature and culture may thus seem tarnished as it is occupied by another group of individuals who do not have the same relation to their environment.

In a situation in which squatters are regarded as wholly Other, the government may be less likely to push for assimilation or settlement of the groups involved and more likely to react in some other manner—such as the taking of criminal or punitive measures or pushing for deportation if the camp's residents are foreign. As early as 2002, Didier Bigo noted that migration in Western Europe was increasingly perceived as a security problem, and he argued that both private and public interests in Europe were actively seeking to securitize these issues in order to strengthen the state and its role. He argued that "The framing of the state as a body endangered by migrants is a political narrative activated for the purpose of political games."⁸¹ In his view, politicians often sought to blur the lines between migrants, terrorists, criminals, spies and counterfeiters as part of a larger strategy of immigration management.⁸² In depicting migrants as dangerous and unlike oneself, it became easier to discipline and control migrants without encountering local opposition to heavy-handed government tactics.

This view is useful as we consider the increasingly foreign makeup of property squatters within Europe today. A recent UK Shelter report indicates that an increasingly large number of UK squatters are so-called A8 nationals: those from the countries of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.⁸³ As a result, states might also find it useful to emphasize the difference between these property squatters and the more settled residents of their nations. Politicians may thus find themselves emphasizing the exclusionary narrative that focuses on the differences between "proper" homeowners and neighborhood dwellers and squatters, who are regarded as interlopers. This narrative thus justifies taking a hard line against such individuals and groups, since they are seen to threaten the established neighborhood's identity and security. The exclusionist narrative thus leads not to the integration of squatters and homeless residents, but instead focuses simply on managing these individuals—counting them and watching them, as well as registering them and keeping tabs on them—particularly if they are foreign.

In exclusionist discourse, squatters themselves are regarded as marginal, and as not having a politics. The "politics" of the squatting issue are set forth by asking the question "How might existing society best be protected from this threat?" Within this type of discourse, there is no space for acknowledging that squatters are also the subject of politics with rights that must be acknowledged and respected. (Here, squatters may be blamed for having created the conditions for their own exclusion—for example, by adopting an antistate philosophy or their exclusion may be the result of forces such as racism or the colonialist legacy.) The exclusionary narrative presents society or the community as the object of security that is being defended, while assimilationist discourses tend to describe the state as the object of security. Because societal security is seen as zero-sum in exclusionist discourse, there is less likelihood that a rapprochement can come about between the community that seeks to defend its identity, and the squatters who are seen as threatening that identity.

The notion of abjection explains not only government policy but also the reactions of citizens. When citizens regard the distance between themselves and the squatters not as something to be overcome but rather as something absolute, they are more likely to oppose the existence of squatter settlements or "camps" in their own neighborhoods. Instead of charity, citizens are more likely to practice "NIMBYism." NIMBY is an abbreviation here of the slogan "not in my backyard." Though the phrase was originally a rallying cry uttered by people opposing developments that they saw as carrying a risk to the environment or their health (for example, banding together to oppose the siting of a nuclear power plant near one's neighborhood), NIMBYism can also be understood as a larger discursive strategy in which citizens seek to protect their property from a variety of threats. (It thus both reinforces and results from securitization.) Those who seek to exclude marginal individuals like refugees and squatters from their neighborhoods through legal strategies may be

concerned merely about the economic damage that might occur to their house's property price, or their actions may also have racial or class-based overtones.

More recently, Hubbard has suggested that opposition to the siting of asylum and refugee centers in Britain is a variant of NIMBYism. Here he suggests that NIMBYers are defending a particular English sociocultural identity, noting that NIMBYers protesting against the construction of the asylum centers "evoked particular imaginings of asylum seekers, depicting them as Others who would potentially undermine local ways of life."⁸⁴ That is, neighbors today can be seen as working to defend their borders from "invasion" by dark Others—just as nations have historically done. NIMBYism thus becomes the microlevel articulation of security language and security procedures. Thus, while the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act was designed to protect the state on a macrolevel from the immigrant threat—through introducing new immigration controls, curtailing the civil rights of asylum seekers and changing legislation regarding receipt of welfare payments by asylum seekers⁸⁵—the more recent 2011 squatting legislation now seeks to extend this protection to particular communities within England, in order to protect the state on an intrastate or local level.

However, governments and neighbors are not the only ones practicing exclusionist strategies that emphasize social distance over the possibility of inclusion and assimilation. In some instances, squatters themselves avoid assimilation. Ideological or anarchist squatting is thus a type of assimilationist move. Unlike the survival squatting of those found in places of abjection, ideological squatting is often practiced by educated individuals of means who consciously choose to live outside the law and outside society. As Ian Friedman comments in his investigation of squats in Israel, "an anarchist squat is an abandoned building taken over by a group of people not because they're otherwise homeless but because they believe it's 'absurd . . . that people have to kill themselves working (at steady jobs) in order to have a place to live.'"⁸⁶ That is, they do not squat because they have no other options, but rather because they choose to do so. Anders Corr writes on an anarchist web site:

Squats are growing as a form of resistance within the anarchist community . . . anarchists see squatting as a practical way of subverting current dominative constructs of real estate while at the same time creating a space for the growth of community forms which prefigure the sought-for anarchist utopia. This current activity continues an anarchist project against spatial property . . . the commodification of food and housing.⁸⁷

An anonymous anarchist who gives his address as "Vancouver, Canada, territory of the indigenous Coast Salish peoples" answers the question "why do I squat" with the following words:

I want to take control of my life, of where and how I live, of the social and material conditions of my life. . . . I want and need space to breathe,

eat, drink, socialize, be creative and enjoy my life. I need space to think and plan and prepare, so that I can progressively expand my creative projects, which at the same time are destructive projects to undermine all the institutions of exploitation and politics.⁸⁸

The philosophy of anarchist squatting is neither uniform nor clearly defined. Some squatters are more politically informed and politically astute than others. Some seem to conflate Marxist-Leninist ideas (about doing away with the state and the superstructure) with anarchy. Some see the movement's roots as existing in Russian communism and collectivization while others cite Thoreau and the fact that his cabin at Walden was built on borrowed land. Anarchist squatting may also be associated, in some instances, with criminality. Writings by such anarchist and terrorist theorists as Bakunin, Nechaev and Marighella emphasize the advantages of living within the seams of society and outside the reach of government if one is plotting against the government. Here, squatting may be seen as merely one manifestation of a larger strategy of antistate activity.

As this short survey has shown, one can find both narratives in more historic discussions of squatting in Western Europe. At some times, government policies towards squatting have led to a widening of suffrage and citizenship while at other times policies were exclusionary and punitive. However, what is clear today is that the pendulum has again swung towards the exclusionary end of the scale. What was described throughout the 1960s and 1970s as an alternative lifestyle or a social nuisance is now increasingly described as a problem of security. Squatters were at various times portrayed as violating a variety of values and institutions, including sanctity, sovereignty, identity, solidarity and community or neighborhood. But today we can point to an increasing emphasis on the portrayal of squatters as outsiders, or different from ourselves. Here I contend that European squatting policy has moved gradually from an assimilationist model to an abjection or securitization model—to some degree as the result of a changed environment but also as the result of changes in the perception of squatting, which was colored by the prejudices of both the citizens and their elected officials. In each case, the major outcome of an issue's securitization was a shift from an assimilationist, inclusive view of property squatting, in which society strives to extend the housing franchise to all and to make good, hardworking productive citizens out of property squatters, to a new exclusionist view in which property squatters are viewed as outside the parameters of decent society, incapable of being assimilated, and as enemies of the state who need to be punished or deported. And while the inclusionist view assumes that the problem will largely solve itself as economic development proceeds apace, the exclusionist view assumes that only large-scale government action against squatters from on high can begin to solve the crisis, which is clearly too worrisome to simply leave alone.

Housing policy debates and the policies enacted in this sphere thus have affected the security of individual homeowners, those who live in a

neighborhood, the city itself, the region and even the state. When politicians make housing policy including outlining policies towards squats and slums, the objects of security are manifold. Housing policies can serve to secure the state, the locality or region, the city and the safety and security of residents and their homes as well. The state is seen as responsible for the security being provided at all these levels.⁸⁹ Burgess refers to a continuum of security, which ranges from internal to external security. He suggests that the state's power to regulate may increase as one moves along the continuum, but all sections of the continuum are related. Figure i.1 illustrates the various levels of security that can be affected by migration and housing policy.⁹⁰

In this work, we see that state security policies are related—both those occurring outside the state and those occurring inside the state. As Balzacq notes, securitization is a technique consciously articulated by those in authority who wish to securitize a problem, in order to resolve it quickly and with a minimum of public discussion.⁹¹ However, one can point to certain “felicitous circumstances” that allow politicians to *successfully* securitize the discussion of property squatting and to convince citizens to view this issue through the lens of security as well. First, in each nation of Europe that is examined, the absolute numbers of urban property squatters rose in the last ten years (largely as the result of changes to the world economy, which may have left larger numbers homeless or without employment). In addition, increases in international property squatting occurred within an environment in which citizens were increasingly concerned about crime—both domestic crimes against property and their persons, and international crimes such as terrorism. As a result, a strategy that moved to criminalize property squatting found fertile soil upon which to proceed.

In each of the nations that provide the case studies for this work (France, Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark) elites in the Departments of Housing and the Interior and in Parliament used a three-pronged strategy that sought publicity around the issue of property squatting, which attempted to build and attach notoriety to the property squatters themselves, and which attempted to merge the interests of the media and politicians so that they were indeed “speaking the same language.” As Balzacq notes, the securitizing actor thus works to convince the general public to adhere to a particular version of the story, which emphasizes the security threat created by the object of securitization, and which builds a consensus regarding the need to act in response to the newly identified (though not newly emerging) threat.⁹² He operates from a position of power in “doing security.”

Towards Critical Squatter Studies: Discourse and the Construction of the Squatter

However, as Bigo notes, those who seek to deploy security discourse or to securitize an issue are not usually straightforward about either their actions or their motives. Thus, the challenge for the researcher is to work

Table i.3 Assimilationist versus Exclusionary Discourses

	Assimilationist	Exclusionary
Positive	Improvement	
Negative	Free rider Deviance Crime Investment	Barbarism Threat to community Security Nationalism

backwards—examining the evolution of threat discourse, and seeking to identify the themes, metaphors and rhetorical devices that have led to securitization of an issue. For this analysis, I have examined major national newspapers for each nation chosen as a case study—using original sources in English, Dutch and French. I used keyword searches to identify articles about squatting and squatters, searching from the year 2000 until 2012. For each article, key descriptors and metaphors involving squatters were noted and a master list of these terms was compiled to identify recurring themes and patterns. (All work was coded twice, once by myself and once by an assistant.)

As a result, I have identified nine frames deployed by the media and often by politicians as well in describing the problematic of squatting and the squatter. As Table i.3 indicates, frames differ according to two dimensions—discourse can be either positively or negatively oriented towards the phenomenon, and discourse can also be oriented towards two different types of policy positions.

In addition, one can note that not all press coverage of the squatting issue is negative, nor are all of the frames deployed negative. Of the negative frames, one can note that four fit into the assimilationist narrative while four fit into the exclusionist narrative. In the assimilationist narrative frames, squatters and squatted residences may be described as problematic, but the practices are ones that are viewed as repairable, leading to an outcome whereby squatters (like terrorists) are seen as capable of being rehabilitated and assimilated or reassimilated into society. In contrast, the frames of barbarism, threat to the community, security and nationalism depict a squatter who is often foreign, clearly Other and largely incapable of being assimilated or joining society and civilization.

In this analysis, I arrive at two particular findings: First, it becomes clear that in each case study, over time the frames have shifted—from negative assimilationist narratives to negative exclusionary narratives. I also find that these frames have led to a radically different conception or construction of today's squatter—in contrast to the squatter described by politicians and popular press in the early 2000s. That is, the term squatter is no longer merely a neutral designation but is rather a pejorative term applied by those

in authority to confer a negative identity on those who squat. In this way, it becomes impossible for anyone in Europe today to hear the term “squatter” outside the discourse presented in the media and in legal and legislative proceedings. It is impossible for the squatter to present his case in any sort of neutral way because of the pervasiveness of the discourse about squatting.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a squatter merely as “a person who settles on new, especially public land without title, or a person who takes unauthorized possession of unoccupied premises.”⁹³ That is, it is a merely a legal designation of someone who does not have title to the land that he occupies. However, Fox O'Mahony and Cobb point to “discursive constructions of squatters and squatting” that emerged in the UK in recent years. Here they call our attention to the ways in which the media presented squatters in 2002 and argue that current understandings of what it means to squat in the UK rest on implicit moral understandings.⁹⁴ Beginning with 2002's adverse possession claims that were heard in British courts, they suggest that the media began portraying squatters as thieves who attempted to “steal” something that was not theirs.⁹⁵ In this way, the subject of squatting came to be framed not merely within a discussion about land use, but rather within a discussion about freeloading and “the immorality of jumping the queue.”⁹⁶

In addition, today discussions about squatting are often framed within a larger discussion about violence. Here we can consider a headline that appeared in Britain's *Daily Mail* in 2009, which noted that “Riot police storm G20 protestors' squats . . . as violence spreads to France.” Here, the word squat in the headline is paired with pictures of policemen in riot gear, and references to tear gas, missiles being thrown, mobs throwing bombs, and anarchists, knives, burglary and arson.⁹⁷ In addition, the discourse of squatting has become increasingly racialized. In France in particular, the larger squatter camp in Calais, populated largely by immigrants and refugees from the Middle East, is known as “the jungle.”

In each of these situations, the individual or group (usually a politician or the media) who defines the terms and attaches labels to a situation thus enjoys power. The labeler has the ability to shape how an audience views the situation as well as to begin to dictate which options are on the table and which solutions are viewed as acceptable and unacceptable.⁹⁸ The adoption of an exclusionary (or securitization) perspective in describing squatting and squatters thus delegitimizes the claims that the object of securitization may be making. By portraying those who violate societal norms as antisocial actors and as a monolithic, dangerous set of enemies, none of the issues that they raise need to be properly addressed or taken seriously within the polity. Thus the securitization perspective stops analysts, journalists and citizens from asking questions like the following: Why isn't there more affordable housing available to the poor and marginalized in our societies? Why are so many European youth without the resources to make a life for themselves? Why is migration between European nations and the attainment of a decent

standard of living possible for some types of Europeans but not others? Why do we welcome those who are educated and seek to include them in our societies while we do not do the same for those whose main contribution is the provision of manual labor? Why are the promises of Europe open to some but not all? In a sense, simply applying the term closes the conversation. Since governments don't negotiate with terrorists (or property squatters), it is no longer important that anyone in society, in the media or in government take seriously any of the claims or questions that a representative of the demonized group might raise.

In recent years, the term "property squatter," like the term "terrorist," has become politicized and embedded within a larger narrative, in such a way that it is no longer possible to think objectively about the term itself or the person or group to whom it is applied. While previously the property squatter was understood as a sort of folk hero, carrying on in the tradition of Robin Hood, today he is more likely to be associated with social unrest, violence and antistate activity. Similarly, Bigo suggests that the term "immigrant" itself has taken on a pejorative connotation in Europe in recent years. He suggests that it no longer refers simply to passports, but rather connotes danger—"immigrant" actually means poor and inassimilable.⁹⁹

Youth activists in particular have spoken out about the demonization of the property squatter and the rise of this sort of logic. Most recently, Professor Alexander Vasudevan argued that if the public can be persuaded to believe that anyone who occupies a building for any length of time to make a political protest is a dangerous property squatter then the government has now forged a particularly effective weapon for shutting down all sorts of protests—including students who demonstrate against higher tuition, workers who occupy a factory to demand higher wages or individuals who might be demonstrating on behalf of the environment. He has asked if it is merely coincidental that the government organized so quickly to pass legislation giving them greater rights to confront property squatting at the same time that Occupy London protests were spreading, and with them the occupation of historic sites like St. Paul's Cathedral.¹⁰⁰

Here, Wilkinson asks us to distinguish between proximate context and the distal context in studying securitization. Proximate context refers to the immediate features of an interaction and the setting of a securitization move—the stage on which it is made, the genre in which it is made, the audience to whom it is pitched. The distal context refers to the macroenvironment in which securitization occurs—the broader sociocultural context, including matters of social class and ethnicity, regional and cultural settings and site of discourse.¹⁰¹

Here we can suggest that the proximate context of property squatting is the setting in which debate about legislation occurred—the individuals who sat in parliamentary chambers, the words they used and the ways in which they used the media to make claims in favor of and against legislation. The distal context refers to the larger canvas on which the squatting legislation

and enforcement are carried out—including the state of relations between immigrants and native-born citizens. The distal context relies on underlying issues such as the meaning of home and the meaning of neighborhood.

In other words, securitization is produced intersubjectively—with the participation (or collusion) of both the securitizing actor and his audience. Thus, for example, a politician might write an editorial that describes the situation in the hopes that it might resonate with newspaper readers, who would then take up similar language and frames of reference in describing the issue. In this situation, certain elements are required for "successful" securitization of an issue—that is, one in which there is a general acceptance of the existence of the crisis or threat, the need for emergency measures to be taken in relation to the crisis or threat and the successful passage of legislation or some other set of measures to address the problem.¹⁰²

FOUR CASES

In this work, I consider four cases in which securitization was extended to the housing sector, particularly in the areas of defending and protecting the neighborhood and city against the "threat" of property squatters. I chose the cases—France, Netherlands, Denmark and Great Britain—because each illustrates a particular aspect of the debate taking place on both an elite and a popular level regarding the dangers posed by urban property squatting. (They thus represent "most similar cases.")¹⁰³

The work uses both case studies and interviews with those engaged in debates today about the dangers of squatting and its relationship to security politics more generally. In considering the four cases, one can identify four trends that have occurred in each case. In each nation, we have seen the creation and imposition of increased penalties against those who squat. We have also seen the increased usage—both in the press and by policymakers themselves—of the language of racism and difference to describe and define the squatter. We have seen more violent clashes between squatters and law enforcement, and we have seen in each society a shift away from viewing squatting as an "alternative lifestyle" to viewing it within a crime frame.

The case study that features most centrally in this work is an examination of the events that led to the adoption of amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill in Great Britain, which makes up chapter 2. Britain, like the other European countries examined here, has a long history of tolerating property squatting. Citizen groups like Shelter, for example, arose as the result of citizen activism in the 1960s and 1970s, in which displaced residents occupied buildings to protest against housing shortages and policies that failed to provide adequate housing for British families. In this situation, a rapprochement eventually evolved between the activists and the government, with government providing amnesties to squatters and creating schemes for squatters to buy squatted properties. In

addition, laws regarding adverse possession have allowed some squatters to eventually claim rightful ownership of the properties they had squatted, provided they met certain conditions.

However, in the period since 2001, British society and the media have become increasingly hostile to property squatters. Tabloid coverage has focused on building and orienting public ire regarding two types of squatters: First, the news has focused on high-profile cases in which groups of youth have occupied expensive properties in fashionable London neighborhoods. These youth are often middle-class and educated and may be squatting for ideological reasons—such as an opposition to capitalism. At the same time, news coverage has focused on international property squatters—including migrant workers from Eastern Europe or the Middle East who may be squatting for reasons of survival. (Included in this framework are large numbers of Roma squatters as well.) Squatters are described as being well organized and well versed in their rights. They are seen as having taken advantage of loopholes in existing legislation to make it difficult for homeowners to evict them. Thus, in the period since 2006, the UK government has attempted to pass new legislation aimed at closing loopholes. Crispin Blunt, the conservative justice minister, issued a report in July 2011 that proposed changing the designation of the matter of squatting through relating squatting as a criminal offense for which persistent offenders would go to prison. Such a step formally abolished the practice of granting squatter's rights, gave squatted businesses the same protections that homeowners enjoyed and made sure that squatters were also prosecuted for any other crimes they committed while squatting (including the theft of electricity and vandalism).¹⁰⁴ The October 2012 passage of amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill has led to the criminalization of property squatting and property squatters. The Great Britain study examines the press's role in creating a drive to criminalize squatting, as well as the media's role in constructing the squatter and the act of squatting as a threat to domestic security.

In chapter 3, I consider the case of Denmark. In Denmark, squatting has often had an ideological, antistate character. The case study of Freetown Christiania examines state policy towards an anarchist enclave of nearly one thousand people located on an abandoned military base within Copenhagen's city limits. For thirty years, the site enjoyed the status of an autonomous region (with its own currency, social infrastructure and norms) but recently it was forcibly reincorporated within Copenhagen's administrative structure. As Jacek Pawlicki describes the situation, the large-scale squat of Juliana Christiania in Copenhagen, which was established in 1971 when a group of residents took illegal possession of an abandoned military base, was originally conceptualized as a large-scale social experiment in living an alternative lifestyle. "Christiania" thus represented a sort of sanctuary for those whose lives were "deviant" or so far outside the norm that they could not live comfortably in an everyday

setting. For this reason, individuals came from all over Denmark to take up residence in Christiania.¹⁰⁵

However, despite having coexisted relatively peacefully with neighbors in Copenhagen for nearly forty years, the territory recently began experiencing increasing monitoring and surveillance by police who have sought to portray it as a space of danger, associated with drugs, gangs and prostitution. As an example, one can compare and contrast the descriptions of Freetown Christiania provided on the city of Copenhagen's tourist web site with the descriptions of Freetown Christiania that appeared in the media and popular press in 2009, prior to the Supreme Court decision to terminate the autonomous status of the enclave. On the tourist web site Copenhagen.com, visitors are told that Freetown Christiania is "one of a kind," and informed that:

The approx. 850 citizens of Christiania work as artisans (carpenters, blacksmiths), and the famous Christiania Bikes (bicycle trailers) are produced here. The inhabitants have also established meditation centers, cafés, restaurants, and a couple of music night clubs. The Solvoguen Theatre Group has until 1983 performed happenings, also outside the Town. Many houses, built, painted and decorated by their first inhabitants, became historical objects. Christiania is unique; one of its kind in the world, and for many people became a symbol of Danish liberal lifestyle.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, press reports note that:

There have been outbreaks of violence including gun battles on the streets as rival gangs fight for control of Christiania's drugs trade. On the notorious Pusher Street, skinheads with pit bulls glare menacingly from behind their stalls draped in camouflage netting at anyone who looks like they might be there to do anything other than buy drugs.¹⁰⁷

While forty years ago, a city like Copenhagen was comfortable harboring a sanctuary for deviant behavior within its borders, the international and domestic security climate has changed greatly since then. In chapter 6, the Copenhagen squat can be conceptualized as an enclave—a very particular type of liminal space—existing within the legal confines of a city, but often operating by its own norms and relational structures and frequently populated by individuals who do not look like the rest of the residents of the state. The Danish squatter enclave of Freetown Christiania, for example, has its own anthem, its own flag and its own currency.¹⁰⁸ It thus came to represent a sort of failed state that bordered Copenhagen, and security measures were thus taken to annex it.

In chapter 4, we consider France. Here Sarkozy's attempt to securitize property squatting by the Roma was largely unsuccessful and securitization failed in France. Vuori argues that an issue is securitized when the lan-

guage or discourse used to talk about the issue shifts, regardless of whether actual acts are taken that change the situation with regard to the object of securitization. Thus, if the media begins to speak of Arab American immigrants in the United States differently after 9/11 then the position of Arab American immigrants was securitized, even if no legislation is ever passed reflecting this position. He also argues that not all attempts at securitization are successful—that is, a politician or agency may launch a speech about a particular threat only to find the audience of other politicians as well as the public unresponsive. In such a case, securitization moves can be said to have failed.¹⁰⁹ In the French case, the moves by Sarkozy to quickly close nearly three hundred Roma squats throughout France, as well as a move to encourage Roma from Bulgaria and Romania to voluntarily depart from France, were immediately denounced in both the French and the international press. Press reporters made analogies to Vichy France, noting that the last time France rounded up and deported gypsies was during World War II. The killing of a policeman in Grenoble, which was given as the reason why a security crackdown was necessary, was not understood or supported by either French citizens or opinion makers in the nation. As Žizek notes, “securitization is only successful when it finds it support in everyday life, when even the facts which at first sight seem to contradict it start working in its favor.”¹¹⁰ In the French case, it became impossible to successfully reframe the problem of Roma citizens in France as a security problem and the attempt was ultimately aborted.

In contrast, we can consider the successful securitizations of the issue of property squatting in the UK and Denmark. Here we can see how in each case a broad social consensus was built regarding the existence of a crisis or threat, a need for the undertaking of emergency or unusual measures was articulated, and such measures were carried out. The securitizing actor has found a language and a way of building a bridge between himself and the broader audience (in the case of British property squatters, for example, through the use of public interest stories on victims of property squatting placed in mass audience publications such as the *London Evening Standard* and the *Daily Mail*) in order to persuade them of the existence of and the seriousness of the threat. Language and images may be chosen to speak to the audience, so that the threat seems both meaningful and real to them.

Here, I should note that I view successful securitization as operating along a continuum. In several of the case studies, one can make a counterargument, noting that not *all* Danish citizens (including the residents of Christiania, the objects of securitization itself) were on board regarding either the existence of a crisis or the need to respond. However, in each case one can point to clear products of securitization: In Britain, we can point to the passage in both houses of Parliament of clause 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, which criminalized property squatting. In Denmark, we can point to the adoption of formal measures to incorporate

the squatter settlement of Christiania into the larger government workings of Copenhagen.

In chapter 5, I consider the case of the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, squatting formally became illegal in October 2010, after a relatively brief discussion in the Dutch Parliament. The new legislation represents a radical shift from the days of the 1970s, when squatting was tacitly accepted by the Dutch government as a reasonable compromise given a housing shortage, high youth unemployment and a tendency for landlords to leave buildings empty for long periods of time. The freewheeling image of Holland as a place that allows dope smoking, prostitution and alternative lifestyles was repudiated with the adoption of the 2010 legislation. Traditionally, Holland was a place where citizens preferred less government, not more—and where the acceptance of practices like euthanasia suggests that government does not like to and is not encouraged to intrude into people's private lives.

In contrast, the new legislation seems to represent a more heavy-handed Dutch approach to governance. The legislation imposes penalties on those who refuse to vacate a squat—which include a year's imprisonment, or more, if the eviction procedure turns violent. Although the law was passed in 2010 a legal suit one month later led a Dutch Court of Appeals to rule that the law was in violation of European Human Rights statutes.¹¹¹ Specifically it was found to violate article 8 of the EU Human Rights Convention, which states that everyone has a right to a private life, a family life and a home. However, despite the swift actions taken to strike down the legislation, the language of securitization appears in the judicial ruling. The ruling states that in certain circumstances, article 8 may be set aside. In particular, this may occur “in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country.” That is, security concerns can still be used as a justification for shutting down property squats.

Finally, a case study of the Netherlands examines the dialectic between two competing notions of what housing is—a human right, or an economic good produced by the free market. What happens when Europeans disagree about this question, particularly as they travel within Europe? In the Dutch case, squatters appealed to the EU Commission, arguing that criminalizing squatting violated their human rights. What is the likelihood that Europeans can form a unified understanding of how property squatting should be understood and treated?

Table i.4 illustrates differences between the four different cases in regards to answering these questions: Who securitizes? What is being securitized? And how is securitization taking place? In this work's conclusion, we consider whether housing issues can be desecuritized and examine the necessary conditions to bring this about. We also consider the views of squatters themselves, in particular their contention that squatting never was and still is not a security problem. In this way, we establish the preconditions for talking back to securitization through considering the data provided by squatters

Table i.4 Who and What Is Being Securitized?

Nation	Strategy	Who		
		securitizes?	Decision	Frame
Great Britain	Abjection	• "Bottom up" • Media • Elites	• Criminalization of squatting legislation	• Criminality • Deviance • Security
Holland	Abjection	Government	Criminalization of squatting	• Deviance • Security
Denmark	Institutionalization	• Elites • Police • Judicial system	• Make Christianity part of "official" Denmark	• Criminality
France	Abjection	Government?	Set up camps for Roma	• Criminality

themselves regarding the existence or nonexistence of the problem, as well as their views regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of government actions towards squatting. Here we see squatters rejecting the anti-social label and instead questioning existing "knowledge" about squatters. In this way, we can see more clearly the power politics involved in the securitization of squatting, and the way that different epistemic communities have developed different knowledge about the subject.

1 How We Talk about Squatting

The advent of globalization in the late twentieth century has remade the map of the world and as a result has led to the creation of new social, political and economic institutions and patterns. But globalization is, as many analysts have noted, a double-edged sword. It produces new opportunities for democratization, increases in individual and group wealth and increased social and geographic mobility. However, at the same time, it gives rise to new dangers and challenges—from the threat of asymmetric warfare being perpetrated within and upon a society, to the threats of overpopulation and transnational crime.

The challenges posed by globalization—including threats to national identities and the problems of urban security and border control—may seem new to analysts today, but they are in fact merely a reemergence of problems that have existed historically. As Mark Salter argues, the tendency for those in authority to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate movement by individuals within and between states and territories can be traced back to the Middle Ages. In his work on the history of the passport, he suggests that the king—and later the sovereign state—has historically exercised power to regulate, govern and approve of citizen movements outside the kingdom or the state's borders. And as he notes, particularly in periods of great social change—such as the Middle Ages, the period following the Reformation and even the early 1900s prior to World War I—states have been particularly keen to regulate the ways in which their population has left their borders, as well as who has permission to enter their borders. That is, states have also long acknowledged the connection between creating a strong state based on a unified national identity, and policies that regulated who may and may not enter the state or claim its benefits as a citizen.¹

This context is important as we begin to examine the phenomenon of urban property squatting in Europe today, and particularly the challenge of transnational urban property squatting. As the analysis of legislation to criminalize property squatting shows, today we are seeing two particularly interesting security developments that, though novel, are not new.

First, we can note the decline in the importance of the state as the main architect and guarantor of security today—as regional and even local